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AI Privacy·November 18, 2026·7 min read

How Federal Agencies Access Flock License-Plate Data Without Contracts

The contract loophole: why informal agreements enable warrantless surveillance

Federal agencies don't need to hack Flock Safety's systems. They don't need a warrant. In many cases, they don't even need a formal contract. What they need is an MOU — a handshake arrangement dressed up in bureaucratic language — and access to 20 million license plate reads per day flows freely.

ICE and CBP have been accessing Flock's Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR) network through Memoranda of Understanding and interagency agreements rather than standard procurement contracts. This is a structural choice, not an oversight. It eliminates competitive bidding, suppresses public cost disclosure, and creates a legal authorization gap that makes congressional auditing nearly impossible.

Formal procurement contracts leave paper trails. They require justification, public posting, and legal frameworks that specify what data can be accessed and under what conditions. MOUs require none of that. When those MOUs include non-disclosure and confidentiality clauses (which Flock's federal agreements routinely do), even FOIA requests bounce back with redactions or outright rejections. The access terms, the frequency, the scope: all of it disappears behind contractual language that was specifically designed to keep it there.

How Flock enables real-time federal access to license-plate data

Flock Safety operates the largest private ALPR network in North America. Over 1,000 law enforcement agency partners feed into its infrastructure, which captures more than 20 million plate reads per day. A database of everyone, not just suspects.

Federal agents access this through real-time API connections and historical data retention extending to 30 days or more. The practical effect: an ICE agent can query where a specific vehicle has been seen across multiple states, across weeks, without ever appearing before a judge. No warrant. No probable cause affidavit. No judicial review.

The legal argument agencies use to justify this is the third-party doctrine, which holds that individuals have no reasonable expectation of privacy in data they've voluntarily shared with a third party. The doctrine emerged from cases involving bank records and phone numbers in the 1970s. Applying it to continuous, real-time, multi-jurisdictional movement tracking is a category error — but one that agencies have been exploiting for years because no court has stopped them yet.

CBP and ICE have conducted thousands of license-plate lookups through Flock without documented legal authorization or warrant justification. That number comes from FOIA releases and government records analysis, not from any centralized federal audit, because no centralized federal audit exists.

What the FOIA evidence shows about federal-Flock data sharing

GAO analysis found that more than 50 federal agencies have some form of ALPR data access through informal arrangements. Most Americans have no idea this infrastructure exists, let alone that it operates largely outside the warrant requirement.

FOIA releases confirm that ICE uses Flock data specifically for immigration enforcement operations. This matters beyond the Fourth Amendment question. Immigration enforcement involves civil proceedings, not criminal prosecution, which means due process protections are already weaker. Layering warrantless surveillance on top of a civil enforcement system produces a situation where someone can be located, detained, and deported based on plate-reader data that was never subject to judicial scrutiny at any point in the chain.

The confidentiality clauses embedded in federal-Flock agreements block disclosure of how often agencies access the data, what investigations triggered the queries, and whether any cost-sharing occurs between agencies. There is no public accounting. Congress cannot audit what it cannot see, and these agreements were structured so that Congress cannot see much.

Challenging this arrangement is difficult precisely because no formal contract exists. Without one, there is no legal framework imposing Fourth Amendment safeguards on the access, no terms-of-service violation to litigate, no procurement rule to enforce. The informality creates the immunity.

The third-party doctrine trap: why informal access exploits a legal vulnerability

The third-party doctrine was articulated in Smith v. Maryland (1979) and United States v. Miller (1976). In Smith, the Supreme Court held that dialing a phone number conveyed that number to the phone company, eliminating any privacy expectation. In Miller, bank records shared with a financial institution were fair game for government access.

Neither case involved a system that passively records every vehicle's location multiple times per day and stores that data for federal retrieval on demand. The doctrine was never designed to cover this. The Supreme Court signaled as much in Carpenter v. United States (2018), where the Court held that accessing seven days of historical cell-site location data required a warrant. The majority opinion specifically noted that the third-party doctrine shouldn't apply mechanically to technologies that enable comprehensive surveillance.

Carpenter hasn't been extended to ALPR data yet. Federal agencies know this. Informal agreements allow them to exploit the gap between Carpenter's logic and its current legal reach, accessing plate-reader data without warrant requirements while the doctrine remains unsettled. A formal contract creates a legal relationship that can be challenged, audited, and litigated. An MOU with a confidentiality clause creates a relationship that can be denied.

Why voters are rejecting ALPR expansion

Ballot measures from 2024 onward show a 70% or higher voter rejection rate for ALPR expansion and surveillance infrastructure funding where measures have been decided. Voters in multiple jurisdictions, presented with direct choices about whether to fund and expand plate-reader networks, have said no at rates that would constitute a landslide in any election.

The public concern isn't abstract. When the question is put plainly, people recognize that a system recording every vehicle's movements and making that data available to federal agencies without a warrant is not a neutral public safety tool. Groups including the ACLU and Electronic Frontier Foundation have been effective at communicating exactly what these systems do and who accesses them.

Agencies that rely on informal, non-transparent data-sharing arrangements with private companies become exposed when those arrangements become public. The informal structure that was supposed to provide cover ends up generating more scrutiny, not less, once FOIA releases and investigative reporting make the access patterns visible. ICE and CBP are now operating surveillance infrastructure that a majority of voters, when asked directly, say they don't want.

What legal and structural changes are needed

Four changes would materially alter this situation.

Federal agencies must be required to obtain warrants before accessing license-plate data, regardless of whether that data is held by a private company or a government entity. Carpenter pointed toward this conclusion. Congress should codify it.

All federal-vendor data-sharing agreements must be subject to FOIA disclosure, competitive bidding, and public cost accounting. Confidentiality clauses that shield access terms from public scrutiny should be unenforceable when the contracting party is a federal agency.

Congress must mandate centralized auditing and reporting of federal ALPR access: which agency, which investigation, what legal justification, what the outcome was. Right now none of that exists. An audit trail is the minimum condition for any meaningful oversight.

Finally, the third-party doctrine needs legislative reform. Carpenter created an exception for comprehensive location tracking via cell sites. That exception should be extended by statute to ALPR data, biometric databases, and any other system enabling continuous surveillance without the subject's knowledge. The 1970s-era doctrine was built for a world where sharing data with a third party was a discrete, conscious act. It doesn't map onto a world where your plate is photographed by a private network that sells access to the federal government through informal agreements designed to avoid scrutiny.

The primary source documents exist. FOIA releases, MOU filings, and GAO reports are available for anyone willing to read them. NEX users can attach these directly to research sessions to trace specific federal-Flock access arrangements. Start there.

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